The IPCC dismissed natural climate change risks

The IPCC dismissed natural climate change in its climate forecasts and risk assessments provided to governments, in its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). This means our governments have not mitigated potentially catastrophic natural climate change risks we are exposed to during this grand solar minimum and during the 21st century. These natural climate change risks include a climate switch back to a global cooling phase, large magnitude or climate-forcing volcanism, rapid climate change, and pandemic influenza.

When your government tells you that it “accepts the evidence for global warming by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in its Fifth Assessment Report (AR5, 2014), and that this represents a global scientific consensus,” you need to know how dangerous such a statement is. Abbreviations: Working Groups 1, 2, or 3 (WG1-3), Fourth or Fifth Assessment Reports (AR4, AR5).

 

SUMMARY: IMPORTANT IPCC DISCLOSURES, OMISSIONS & DATA FACTS
NATURAL CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS WERE NOT ASSESSED
  • Only climate risks relevant to UNFCCC Article 2 were assessed: The IPCC’s Working Group 1 (WG1) categorically tell us “Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which refers to “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”[1] WG1 then tell us that we can reduce the impact of climate change by reducing our emissions.[2]
    • The IPCC dismissed (or omitted) natural climate change risks relevant to these post-Holocene Climate Optimum and current grand solar minimum periods.
  • WG1 only assessed abrupt climate change risks relative to global warming: WG1’s review of rapid climate change was firstly restricted by definition, and then only detailed a small number of categories of abrupt climate change events theoretically linked to global warming, including;[3]
    • Dansgaard-Oeschger rapid warming episodes and Heinrich events causing massive iceberg and melt-water discharges into the Northern Atlantic Ocean. These abrupt climate change events occur after the northern ice caps have already formed and in the depths of an ice age.[4],[5]
    • Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) collapse: WG1’s reference to AMOC collapse reviewed theoretical model simulations and the Laurentide ice sheet lake-dam burst. This ice lake rupture was associated with the 8.2 kiloyear rapid climate change event that took place during the melting of the last ice age’s Arctic ice cap. WG1 and 2 dismissed the prospect of AMOC collapse resulting from global warming, and a northern hemisphere cooling under a strong AMOC reduction.[6] The IPCC did not review the more relevant impact of solar activity and climate-forcing volcanism on abrupt AMOC changes.
    • Catastrophic release of methane is unlikely: WG1’s dismissed the prospect of abrupt methane release during the 21st century from land and oceanic sources due to global warming.[7],[8] Catastrophic methane release last happened during the Paleocene/Eocene thermal maximum 55 million years ago,[9] when global temperatures were twice as high as today’s ice age epoch climate.
  • Rapid climate change events and the Little Ice Age were not critically reviewed: WGs1 and 2, in both AR5 and the special report on “Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation,”[10] did not critically review the catastrophic rapid climate change events (i.e., the 8.2, 5.9, and 4.2 kiloyear RCC events),[11],[12],[13],[14],[15],[16],[17],[18],[19],[20] the Little Ice Age catastrophes (13th to mid-19th centuries),[21],[22],[23][24],[25] and the climate-forcing volcanic eruptions (see citations 48-53), that took place at or after the Holocene Climate Optimum. These events and periods were associated with widespread human catastrophes and the destruction of ancient civilizations by successive and prolonged periods of cold, drought, floods, snow, and disease, famines, and wars.
    • WG1 dismissed the relevance of these historical catastrophes, and in extrapolating their lessons for today’s world. This exemplifies perilous confirmation bias.[26]
  • WG3 failed to provide risk-mitigation advice for climate-forcing volcanism: The IPCC did not account for climate forcing volcanism in their climate predictions, meaning natural cooling factors were eliminated from climate forecast assumptions.[27] More worryingly though is that WG3 did not provide any risk-mitigation advice for climate forcing volcanism.
    • Climate-forcing volcanism was periodically catastrophic during the post-Holocene Climate Optimum period, and especially during the Little Ice Age.[28],[29],[30],[31],[32] Scientists indicate that a repeat of a Laki-like volcanic eruption (Iceland, 1783) would wipe out one year’s worth of food for one-third of the world’s population.[33] Working Group 3 did not provide a mitigation plan for that potential catastrophic climate scenario.
    • Chapter 5 of Revolution demonstrates that grand solar minima and maxima represent high-risk periods for climate forcing volcanism. These high-risk periods were in evidence during the last 11,000 years, and especially during the Little Ice Age.
  • WG1 ignored experts warning of a global cooling during this grand solar minimum: The IPCC ignored or did not review the climate predictions of leading solar-climate experts. These experts warn of Little Ice Age-like conditions during this grand solar minimum (2020-2060 CE).[34],[35],[36],[37],[38],[39],[40],[41] WG1 dismissed solar scientist predictions of solar activity during this grand solar minimum, because they had “low confidence” in their projections.[42]
    • Scientists expert in the Arctic climate and glacier expansion mechanisms have implicated grand solar minima in synergizing the cooling and ice expanding impact of climate-forcing volcanism. This combined solar activity and volcanism helps drive a putative multi-decade- to centennial-scale Arctic glacier ice expansion mechanism.[43],[44],[45],[46],[47]
    • The Little Ice Age’s grand solar minima were associated with cold climates, and with climate-forcing volcanism and pandemic influenza outbreaks (see Revolution, Chapters 4-5, 14).
  • WG1 delayed the next ice age by an unprecedented 30,000 years: To deliver four Representative Concentration Pathway scenarios of global warming in AR5 to fear-monger the world with,[48] Working Group 1’s AR4 predecessor dismissed the next ice age by 30,000 years. This ice age delay hypothesis was not subject to peer review scrutiny.[49] Despite WG1 telling us that this represents a “robust finding” it is in fact erroneous and is readily refutable based on science and statistics (see Chapters 2 and 3 of Revolution.).
    • WG1 also extended the next ice age inception by an unprecedented 50,000 years, and tell us its is “virtually certain” that glaciation will not occur within the next 1,000 years.[50] This assurance comes despite the fact that 5,000 years ago ice began to accumulate at both poles, and northeast Greenland was ice-locked by 3,000 years ago.[51],[52] Moreover, Antarctica’s inner ice domes are 100 meters higher today than 5,000 years ago.[53],[54] Glacier ice rapidly accumulated during the Little Ice Age, reaching its peak buildup by the mid-19th century.[55],[56] Much of this glacier ice melted after the mid-19th century,[57],[58],[59] with this melt initiation preceding significant human activity.
    • Earth entered the ice age millennia ago: Orbitally induced changes to solar irradiance (precession of the summer solstice), which are responsible for controlling ice ages as argued by WG1, have already declined 40-50 Watts/m2 (i.e., 15 times the theoretical radiative forcing impact of today’s greenhouse gas emissions)[60] since the Holocene Climate Optimum eight millennia ago (650N latitudes). This millennial-scale decline in solar irradiance parallels the decline in summer temperature over this time.[61],[62],[63],[64] Greenland’s ice core temperature declined by nearly 50C between 6000 BCE and 1700 CE,[65] or about one-fifth of the Arctic’s interglacial temperature rise.[66] From 1700-2016 the Arctic climate entered a centennial-scale warming oscillation, the most extreme of 39 warming phases over the last 8,000 years.[67] Even with today’s global warming, the Arctic is still 2-4OC lower in temperature than at the Holocene Climate Optimum.[68],[69],[70]
THE IPCC’S FORECAST INACCURACY REFUTES ITS RADIATIVE-FORCING THEORY
  • Planetary cooling is underway: Since 2016 the global and Northern Hemisphere temperatures declined by 0.200C and 0.270C[71] In 2018 Arctic glaciers continued their 6-year expansion due to high levels of summer snow.[72] The 2018 Northern Hemisphere end of summer snow cover extent was also 14.4 percent larger than the 1981-2010 average, building on a 7-year expansion trend.[73] This real world climate data conflicts with the IPCC’s climate forecasts and media manipulation. The IPCC projected a global temperature increase of between 0.30C and 0.70C from 2016 to 2035 (relative to 1986-2005).[74]
  • The IPCC’s radiative-forcing theory is refuted by its inaccurate forecasts: In AR5 WG1 disclosed that 82 percent of its 1986-1998 promoted forecasts understated the temperature, and 97 percent of its 1998-2012 promoted forecasts overstated the temperature, while missing the 15-year climate hiatus (1998-2012). To manage this forecasting failure WG1 suggested it reduce its forecasts by 10% percent, rather than refute the IPCC’s radiative forcing theory.[75] The climate hiatus occurred during a time when carbon dioxide (CO2) increased by 7.4 percent,[76] indicating that carbon dioxide does not control the global temperature or climate.
  • Carbon dioxide’s rise lags the temperature rise: WG1 ignored the inconvenient science that shows carbon dioxide’s rise lags the temperature rise (i.e., via ocean degassing) by months on decadal timescales,[77] and by centuries on glacial cycle timescales.[78],[79],[80],[81] This explains the IPCC’s forecast inaccuracy (1986-2018).
  • Natural climate change was dismissed by WG1: the IPCC attributes 98% of climate change to human activity, in its radiative forcing theory.[82] WG1 specifically dismissed factors known to cool the planet such as low solar activity[83] and volcanism,[84] rendering its forecasts “unrealistic.” WG1 also tell us IPCC climate forecasts assume “there will be no major volcanic eruptions or secular changes in total solar irradiance.”[85]
  • Articles 1 and 2 installed the radiative forcing theory in 1988, not bonafide science: View Article 1 and 2 definitions and the Preface of WG1’s first assessment report to see how the radiative forcing theory became installed in 1990 (see citations [86],[87]). A correlation analysis supporting the cause-and-effect relationship between carbon dioxide and the temperature is conspicuously absent from all WG1 Assessment Reports since 1990. When you do that correlation analysis and compare it with other climate system correlations (i.e., solar activity, atmospheric circulations) it becomes clear why the IPCC climate forecasts are highly inaccurate, and why this analysis is absent from all WG1 assessment reports.
  • IPCC procedures entrenched the radiative forcing paradigm: WG1-3 only reviewed climate science and risks relevant to Articles 1 and 2, and according to IPCC policy and procedures.[88] The InterAcademy Council independently reviewed the IPCC processes and procedures, and rebuked the IPCC for its scientific bias and its processes that enabled that bias.[89],[90] Your promoted global scientific consensus only holds true among the politically aligned government nominated scientists who fill your Working Groups 1-3, and do your biased work.
PUTATIVE POLITICAL AGENDAS
  • Radiative forcing is a sham-science used to fear-monger an energy system switch: Articles 1 and 2, and IPCC procedures are being used to help the United Nations and governments switch the world’s energy system before we run out of proven oil and gas reserves in the decades ahead. Anthropogenic global warming induced climate change, aside from being a sham, is a poorly effective marketing communication strategy for driving this market switch. This marcoms message garners little sense of urgency by world governments, big business and finance, and the public. Look at the market share data and growth rates of renewable energy capacity installation for proof.
  • A looming energy crisis awaits today’s youth in tomorrow’s cold world: In AR5 WG3 reveals that we only have 50 and 70 years (in AR4 the WG3 say “decades”) of proven oil and gas reserves respectively,[91],[92] which is insufficient to produce the projected 21st century anthropogenic global warming we are fear-mongered with. The USA’s Energy Information Agency’s data tells us there is only 50 years of proven oil and gas reserves,[93] without factoring in any population and economic growth. Meanwhile 50% and 70% of total oil and gas reserves respectively are unproven guesstimates, including shale resources,[94],[95] while peak oil and gas discovery is history.[96],[97],[98],[99],[100]
  • The Brundtland Report: “Ensuring a sustainable level of population.”[101] Will natural climate change catastrophes and pandemic influenza during this grand solar minimum inadvertently achieve the Brundtland Report’s objective, by naturally culling the world’s population?

 

CITATIONS (INCLUDING IPCC ASSESSMENT REPORT QUOTATIONS)

 

[1]       WG2 only assessed climate risks relevant to UNFCCC Article 2: IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [Exposé: See pages 59-65, (1) See page 59, Section B-1. Key Risks across Sectors and Regions. “Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which refers to “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (2) See Tables TS.3 (page 60) and TS.4 (page 64) for climate related risks linked only to global warming.].

[2]       WG2 claim climate risks can be reduced by cutting emissions: IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [See page 13 for the risks linked to global warming i.e., sea level rise and flooding, extreme weather events, food and water insecurity, and loss of biodiversity. Page 14. “The overall risks of climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change. Risks are reduced substantially under the assessed scenario with the lowest temperature projections (RCP2.6 – low emissions) compared to the highest temperature projections (RCP8.5 – high emissions), particularly in the second half of the 21st century (very high confidence).”].

[3]       WG1 dismissed the prospect of abrupt climate change: IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; See Page 70, “TFE.5. Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. “There is information on potential consequences of some abrupt changes, but in general there is low confidence and little consensus on the likelihood of such events over the 21st century. Examples of components susceptible to such abrupt change are the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), clathrate methane release, tropical and boreal forest dieback, disappearance of summer sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, long-term drought and monsoonal circulation.” See page 84 “TS.5.4.7 Possibility of Near-term Abrupt Changes in Climate: There are various mechanisms that could lead to changes in global or regional climate that are abrupt by comparison with rates experienced in recent decades. The likelihood of such changes is generally lower for the near term than for the long term. For this reason the relevant mechanisms are primarily assessed in the TS.5 sections on long-term changes and in TFE.5. {11.3.4}” In other words having discounted the possibility of abrupt climate change due to anthropogenic global warming during the 21st century, we are then bamboozled with long-term theoretical risks and model projections which bury the pertinent dismissals and omissions. See page 1114 “Section 12.5.5 Potentially Abrupt or Irreversible Changes: This report adopts the definition of abrupt climate change used in Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.4 of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program CCSP (CCSP, 2008b).” WG1 constrained or limited the definition of abrupt climate change, rather than review abrupt climate change catastrophes that took place just before and after the Holocene Climate Optimum i.e., the Younger Dryas, and 8.2Kyr, 5.9Kyr, 4.2Kyr rapid climate change events, the Little Ice Age, and climate forcing volcanism. All these events and periods represent abrupt climate change under an unconstrained definition, and caused widespread catastrophes and the destruction of ancient civilizations. These are the most relevant climate change risks sitting on our grand solar minimum horizon. See page 1115, “Table 12.4: Components in the Earth system that have been proposed in the literature as potentially being susceptible to abrupt or irreversible change. Column 2 defines whether or not a potential change can be considered to be abrupt under the AR5 definition.” Under its restrictive definition WG1 only details abrupt climate change risks relevant to global warming.].

[4]       Irrelevant Dansgaard-Oeschger rapid warming episodes and Heinrich events reviewed: IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [See page 421. “The most prominent abrupt climate change periods in the recent geological record, developing within 10 to 100 years, are associated with Dansgaard-Oeschger (DO) and Heinrich events (WGI AR5 Section 5.7), which occurred repetitively during the last 120 kyr.”].

[5]       Irrelevant Dansgaard-Oeschger rapid warming episodes and Heinrich events reviewed: IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; See page 432, “Section 5.7: Evidence and Processes of Abrupt Climate Change. This assessment of abrupt climate change on time scales of 10 to 100 years focuses on Dansgaard-Oeschger (DO) events and iceberg/melt-water discharges during Heinrich events.”].

[6]       Global warming induced Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) collapse: IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; See page 24, Section E4 Ocean. “It is very unlikely that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century for the scenarios considered.” (With reference to the IPCC’s 4 promoted Representative Concentration Pathway global warming scenarios.)   See Page 70, “TFE.5. Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. “Abrupt Climate Change Linked with AMOC New transient climate model simulations (i.e., theoretical models are prone to assumption errors) have confirmed with high confidence that strong changes in the strength of the AMOC produce abrupt climate changes at global scale with magnitude and pattern resembling past glacial Dansgaard–Oeschger events and Heinrich stadials.” “It also remains very unlikely that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century for the scenarios considered (high confidence) (TFE.5, Figure 1).” See page 1115,The FIO-ESM model shows cooling over much of the NH that may be related to a strong reduction of the AMOC in all RCP scenarios (even RCP2.6), but the limited output available from the model precludes an assessment of the response and realism of this response. Hence it is not included the overall assessment of the likelihood of abrupt changes.” Needless to say, this FIO-ESM model dismissal represents confirmation bias, because the model output is at odds with the IPCC’s global warming scenarios.].

[7]       IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; Page 70-71, TFE.5, Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. In a theoretical discussion focused only on methane release (from wetlands, permafrost, and ocean hydrates), we are told; “It is very unlikely that CH4 from clathrates will undergo catastrophic release during the 21st century (high confidence).” (CH4 = methane)].

[8]       IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [See page 1079].

[9]       Hans Renssen et al., The climatic response to a massive methane release from gas hydrates: Numerical experiments with a coupled climate model. Faculty of Earth and Life Sciences, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands https://www.geo.vu.nl/~renh/methane-pulse.html.

[10]      WG1 and 2 did not detail the rapid climate change events after the Holocene Climate Optimum: IPCC, 2012: Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation. A Special Report of Working Groups I and II of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V. Barros, T.F. Stocker, D. Qin, D.J. Dokken, K.L. Ebi, M.D. Mastrandrea, K.J. Mach, G.-K. Plattner, S.K. Allen, M. Tignor, and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, and New York, NY, USA, 582 pages [Exposé: See page 122, Section 3.1.7. Surprises / Abrupt Climate Change: One aspect that we do not address in this chapter is the existence of possible tipping points in the climate system (e.g., Meehl et al., 2007b; Lenton et al., 2008; Scheffer et al., 2009), that is, the risks of abrupt, possibly irreversible changes in the climate system. Abrupt climate change is defined as follows in the Glossary: “The nonlinearity of the climate system may lead to abrupt climate change, sometimes called rapid climate change, abrupt events, or even surprises.” Look at this report’s title and ask yourself; why was this subject not reviewed?].

[11]      P. Mayewski et al., (2004). “Holocene climate variability.” Quaternary Research, 62(3), 243-255. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2004.07.001.

[12]      Bernhard Weninger et al., “The Impact of Rapid Climate Change on prehistoric societies during the Holocene in the Eastern Mediterranean.” Documenta Praehistorica XXXVI (2009). UDK 902(4-5)”631\637″>551.583.

[13]      M. Staubwasser, M. and H. Weiss, (2006). “Holocene Climate and Cultural Evolution in Late Prehistoric–Early Historic West Asia.” Quaternary Research, 66(3), 372-387. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2006.09.001.

[14]      Robert K. Booth et al., “A severe centennial-scale drought in midcontinental North America 4200 years ago and apparent global linkages.” The Holocene. Volume 15, Issue 3, 321 – 328. 2005. https://doi.org/10.1191/0959683605hl825ft.

[15]      Stanley J. Krom et al., (2003), Short contribution: “Nile flow failure at the end of the Old Kingdom, Egypt: Strontium isotopic and petrologic evidence.” Geoarchaeology, 18: 395-402. doi:10.1002/gea.10065.

[16]      Ann Gibbons, “How the Akkadian Empire Was Hung Out to Dry.” Science August 20, 1993: Volume 261, Issue 5124, 985. DOI: 10.1126/science.261.5124.985.

[17]      Jianjun Wang, “The abrupt climate change near 4,400 year BP on the cultural transition in Yuchisi, China and its global linkage.” Scientific Reports | 6:27723 | DOI: 10.1038/srep27723. https://www.nature.com/articles/srep27723.pdf.

[18]      J. Wang et al., “The abrupt climate change near 4,400 year BP on the cultural transition in Yuchisi, China and its global linkage.” Scientific Reports 2016 Jun 10;6:27723. doi: 10.1038/srep27723.

[19]      Fenggui Liu and Zhaodong Feng, “A dramatic climatic transition at ~4000 cal. year BP and its cultural responses in Chinese cultural domains.” The Holocene. Volume 22, Issue 10, 1181–1197. April 12, 2012. https://doi.org/10.1177/0959683612441839.

[20]      A. Parker et al., (2006). “A Record of Holocene Climate Change from Lake Geochemical Analyses in Southeastern Arabia.” Quaternary Research, 66(3), 465-476. doi:10.1016/j.yqres.2006.07.001.

[21]      David D. Zhang et al., “Global climate change, war, and population decline in recent human history.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences December, 2007, 104 (49) 19214-19219; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0703073104.

[22]      Dian Zhang et al., “Climate change, social unrest and dynastic transition in ancient China.” China Science Bulletin January, 2005, Volume 50, Issue 2, 137–144. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02897517

[23]      D. Collet and M. Schuh (eds.), “Famines During the ‘Little Ice Age’” (1300–1800), DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-54337-6_2. [See page 21].

[24]      Anthony J. McMichael, “Insights from past millennia into climatic impacts on human health and survival.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences March, 2012, 109 (13) 4730-4737; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1120177109. [See page 4734, column 2, paragraph 2].

[25]      Geoffrey Parker, “Crisis and Catastrophe: The Global Crisis of the Seventeenth Century Reconsidered.” The American Historical Review, Volume 113, No. 4 (October, 2008), 1053-1079. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30223245.

[26]      WG1 dismissed lessons from historical climate catastrophes as irrelevant today. IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages [Exposé: See page 771-772. “There is a specific research field that explores the relationship between large-scale disruptions in climate and the collapse of past empires.“DeMenocal (2001) summarizes evidence that suggests that major changes in weather patterns coincided with the collapse of several previously powerful civilizations, including the Anasazi, the Akkadian, Classic Maya, Mochica, and Tiwanaku empires. Other historical reference points of the interaction of climate with society emerge from analysis of the Little Ice Age. Some studies show that the Little Ice Age in the mid-17th century was associated with more cases of political upheaval and warfare than in any other period (Parker, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011), including in Europe (Tol and Wagner, 2010), China (Brook, 2010), and the Ottoman empire (White, S., 2011).” This is then followed by WG1 dismissal of the relevance of these historical catastrophes in today’s world; “The precise causal pathways that link these changes in climate to changes in civilizations are not well understood due to data limitations. Therefore, it should be noted that these findings from historical antecedents are not directly transferable to the contemporary globalized world.See page 1001, section 18.4.5. “Some studies have suggested that levels of warfare in Europe and Asia were relatively high during the Little Ice Age (Parker, 2008; Brook, 2010; Tol and Wagner, 2010; White, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011), but for the same reasons the detection of the effect of climate change and an assessment of its importance can be made only with low confidence.This is tantamount to confirmation bias.].

[27]         WG1 and 3 ignored the impact volcanism in their climate forecasts and risk-mitigation advice. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 1009“11.3.6.3 Synthesis of Near-term Projections of Global Mean Surface Air Temperature: As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance and no future volcanic eruptions. Future volcanic eruptions cannot be predicted and there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.”].

[28]      J. Slawinska and A. Robock, 2018, “Impact of Volcanic Eruptions on Decadal to Centennial Fluctuations of Arctic Sea Ice Extent during the Last Millennium and on Initiation of the Little Ice Age.” J. Climate, 31, 2145–2167, https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-16-0498.1.

[29]      Clive Oppenheimer, “Climatic, environmental and human consequences of the largest known historic eruption: Tambora volcano (Indonesia) 1815.” Progress in Physical Geography: Earth and Environment (2003). Volume 27, Issue 2, 230 – 259. https://doi.org/10.1191/0309133303pp379ra.

[30]      Anthony J. McMichael, “Insights from past millennia into climatic impacts on human health and survival.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences March 2012, 109 (13) 4730-4737; DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1120177109. [See page 4735, column 2, paragraph 2].

[31]      R.B. Stothers, “Climatic and Demographic Consequences of the Massive Volcanic Eruption of 1258.” Climatic Change (2000) 45: 361. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005523330643.

[32]      C. Oppenheimer, (2003). “Ice core and paleoclimate evidence for the timing and nature of the great mid‐13th century volcanic eruption.” International Journal of Climatology, 23: 417-426. doi:10.1002/joc.891.

[33]      Michael J. Puma et al., “Exploring the potential impacts of historic volcanic eruptions on the contemporary global food system.” Pages Magazine. Science Highlights. Volcanoes and Climate. Volume 23, No 2, December 2015.

[34]      N. Scafetta, “Multi-scale harmonic model for solar and climate cyclical variation throughout the Holocene based on Jupiter-Saturn tidal frequencies plus the 11-year solar dynamo cycle.” Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics (2012). doi:10.1016/j.jastp.2012.02.016.

[35]         Theodor Landscheidt, “New Little Ice Age Instead of Global Warming? Energy & Environment. 2003.” Volume 14, Issue 2, 327–350. https://doi.org/10.1260/095830503765184646.

[36]         R.J. Salvador, “A mathematical model of the sunspot cycle for the past 1000 years,” Pattern Recognition Physics, 1, 117-122, doi:10.5194/prp-1-117-2013, 2013.

[37]         Habibullo Abdussamatov, “Current Long-Term Negative Average Annual Energy Balance of the Earth Leads to the New Little Ice age.” Thermal Science. 2015 Supplement, Volume 19, S279-S288.

[38]      Jan-Erik Solheim, https://www.mwenb.nl/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Blog-Jan-Erik-Solheim-def.pdf. Referred from http://www.climatedialogue.org/what-will-happen-during-a-new-maunder-minimum/. Citing blog for 4-5 solar-climate experts.

[39]      Boncho P. Bonev et al., “Long-Term Solar Variability and the Solar Cycle in the 21st Century.” The Astrophysical Journal, 605:L81–L84, April 10, 2004.

[40]      Nils-Axel Mörner, “Solar Minima, Earth’s rotation and Little Ice Ages in the past and in the future. The North Atlantic–European case.” Global and Planetary Change 72 (2010) 282–293. doi:10.1016/j.gloplacha.2010.01.004.

[41]      A. Mazzarella, “The 60-year solar modulation of global air temperature: the Earth’s rotation and atmospheric circulation connection.” Theoretical and Applied Climatology. 88, 193–199 (2007). DOI 10.1007/s00704-005-0219-z.

[42]         WG1 dismissed the science of solar activity induced climate change and its experts. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4 for solar irradiance and volcanism, “As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance.” “there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.” See page 1007 for how the IPCC dismissed the impact of solar forcing during this grand solar minimum, “As discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4.1.3), the Sun has been in a ‘grand solar maximum’ of magnetic activity on the multi-decadal time scale. However, the most recent solar minimum was the lowest and longest since 1920, and some studies (e.g., Lockwood, 2010) suggest there could be a continued decline towards a much quieter period in the coming decades, but there is low confidence in these projections (Section 8.4.1.3).” Meanwhile, world space programs, satellite industries, and the world’s military rely on that same solar activity science and predictions to inform their operations in space.].

[43]      J. Slawinska and A. Robock, 2018, “Impact of Volcanic Eruptions on Decadal to Centennial Fluctuations of Arctic Sea Ice Extent during the Last Millennium and on Initiation of the Little Ice Age.” J. Climate, 31, 2145–2167, https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-16-0498.1.

[44]      F. Lehner et al., 2013, “Amplified inception of European Little Ice Age by sea ice–ocean–atmosphere feedbacks.” J. Climate, 26, 7586–7602. https://doi.org/10.1175/JCLI-D-12-00690.1.

[45]      C. Newhall et al., 2018, “Anticipating future Volcanic Explosivity Index (VEI) 7 eruptions and their chilling impacts.” Geosphere, v. 14, no. 2, p. 1–32, doi:10.1130/GES01513.1.

[46]      Odd Helge Otterå et al., “External forcing as a metronome for Atlantic multidecadal variability.” Nature Geoscience Volume 3, 688–694 (2010).

[47]      Y. Zhong et al., “Centennial-scale climate change from decadally-paced explosive volcanism: a coupled sea ice-ocean mechanism.” Climate Dynamics (2011) 37: 2373. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00382-010-0967-z.

[48]         IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 79, Box TS.6. This blue boxed text details the Representative Concentration Pathway global warming scenarios and the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 Models used to provide the IPCC’s global warming climate forecasts.].

[49]      WG1 (AR4) deferred the ice age 30,000 years without peer review: IPCC, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 996 pages [Exposé: See page 56, Box TS.6. “The Milankovitch, or ‘orbital’ theory of the ice ages is now well developed. Ice ages are generally triggered by minima in high-latitude NH summer insolation, enabling winter snowfall to persist through the year and therefore accumulate to build NH glacial ice sheets.” Followed by, “Available evidence indicates that the current warming will not be mitigated by a natural cooling trend towards glacial conditions. Understanding of the Earth’s response to orbital forcing indicates that the Earth would not naturally enter another ice age for at least 30,000 years. {6.4, FAQ 6.1}.” See page 85 section TS.6.2.4 Paleoclimate under “Robust Findings” “It is very unlikely that the Earth would naturally enter another ice age for at least 30,000 years. {6.4}”). Critique: There is a statistical consequence in delaying the ice age by 30,000-years because this delay impacts the interglacial period duration, the inter-climate optimum interval, and global-to-Antarctica climate optimum phasing gaps relative to all other glacial cycles for the global (2 million years), Antarctic (800,000 years) and Arctic (248,000 years) climate data. This ice age delay hypothesis is being passed off as though it is a scientific fact, when in reality it is an unproven, non-peer reviewed, and readily falsifiable hypothesis (see Revolution, Chapters 2-4).].

[50]      WG1 (AR5) dismissed the ice age by 50,000 years without peer review: IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. [Exposé; See Page 70, “It is virtually certain that orbital forcing will be unable to trigger widespread glaciation during the next 1000 years. Paleoclimate records indicate that, for orbital configurations close to the present one, glacial inceptions only occurred for atmospheric CO2 concentrations significantly lower than pre-industrial levels. Climate models simulate no glacial inception during the next 50,000 years if CO2 concentrations remain above 300 ppm. {5.8.3, Box 6.2}.” Given the IPCC legacy of forecasting failure this non-peer reviewed assumption should be treated with serious caution.].

[51]      Leonid Polyak et al. “History of sea ice in the Arctic.” Quaternary Science Reviews 29 (2010) 1757–1778, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2010.02.010

[52]      N.L. Balascio et al. “Glacier response to North Atlantic climate variability during the Holocene.” Climate of the Past, 11, 1587-1598, https://doi.org/10.5194/cp-11-1587-2015, 2015.

[53]      The RAISED Consortium1, Michael J. Bentley et al., “A community-based geological reconstruction of Antarctic Ice Sheet deglaciation since the Last Glacial Maximum.” Quaternary Science Reviews. Volume 100, 15 September 2014, 1-9.

[54]      M. Frezzotti1 et al. “A synthesis of the Antarctic surface mass balance during the last 800 years.” The Cryosphere, 7, 303–319, 2013. www.the-cryosphere.net/7/303/2013/doi:10.5194/tc-7-303-2013 © Author(s) 2013. CC Attribution 3.0 License.

[55]      O.N. Solomina et al., 2016, “Glacier fluctuations during the past 2000 years.” Quaternary Science Reviews, 149, 61-90. DOI: 10.1016/j.quascirev.2016.04.008. [See Figure 5, page 276. This figure collates a stacked time series of the number of glacier advances and recessions in each region into a global total.].

[56]      Michael E Mann. “Little Ice Age.” Volume 1, The Earth system: physical and chemical dimensions of global environmental change, 504–509. In Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change (ISBN 0-471-97796-9).

[57]      Leonid Polyak et al., “History of sea ice in the Arctic.” Quaternary Science Reviews 29 (2010) 1757–1778, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2010.02.010

[58]      Christophe Kinnard et al., “A changing Arctic seasonal ice zone: Observations from 1870–2003 and possible oceanographic consequences.” Geophysical Research Letters, Volume 35, L02507, doi:10.1029/2007GL032507, 2008.

[59]      O.N. Solomina et al., (2016). “Glacier fluctuations during the past 2000 years.” Quaternary Science Reviews, 149, 61-90. DOI: 10.1016/j.quascirev.2016.04.008. [See Figure 5, page 276. This figure collates a stacked time series of the number of glacier advances and recessions in each region into a global total.].

[60]         US Environmental Protection Agency. Climate Change Indicators: Climate Forcing. https://www.epa.gov/climate-indicators/climate-change-indicators-climate-forcing#ref1.

[61]         H. Wanner et al., “Structure and origin of Holocene cold events.” Quaternary Science Reviews (2011), doi:10.1016/j.quascirev.2011.07.010. [Comment: See Figure 5a, page 9, depicting the steady decline in Northern Hemisphere summer solar insolation at north 15 and 65 degree latitudes, and indicating that insolation has declined by 40 W/m2. This is based on the landmark research by Berger, 1978 (André Berger, Long-Term Variations of Daily Insolation and Quaternary Climatic Changes. 1978. Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 35(12):2362-2367. DOI: 10.1175/1520-0469(1978)035<2362:LTVODI>2.0.CO;2).].

[62]      D.S. Kaufman et al., “Holocene thermal maximum in the western Arctic (0–180°W).” Quaternary Science Reviews, Volume 23, Issues 5–6, 2004, 529-560. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2003.09.007. [Comment: See the abstract. We are told that the precession-driven summer insolation anomaly peaked 12,000-10,000 years ago. See also Figure 9a which depicts the 65°N insolation anomaly at different times of the year, indicating an approximate 50 Wm-2 decline in summer solstice insolation from its peak 12,000-10,000 years ago.].

[63]      Darrell Kaufman et al., “Recent Warming Reverses Long-Term Arctic Cooling.” September 2009. Science 325(5945):1236-1239. DOI: 10.1126/science.1173983. [Comment: This publication details the Arctic cooling that has been in progress for the last 2,000 years until this recent global warming phase. This millennial-scale cooling trend correlates (r = +0.87 with a R-squared 0.76, see Figure 4.) with a reduction in precession of the solstice driven summer insolation (6 W m−2 insolation at 65°N) for the last 2,000 years. See Figure 3F. The publication indicates a temperature decline of 0.22° ± 0.06°C per 1000 years, which tracks the slow decline in orbitally driven summer insolation at high northern latitudes.].

[64] I. Borzenkova et al., 2015. Climate Change During the Holocene (Past 12,000 Years). In: The BACC II Author Team (eds) Second Assessment of Climate Change for the Baltic Sea Basin. Regional Climate Studies. Springer. https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2F978-3-319-16006-1.pdf

[65]         Data: B.M. Vinther et al., 2009, “Holocene thinning of the Greenland ice sheet.” Nature, Vol. 461, pp. 385-388, 17 September 2009. National Centers for Environmental Information, NESDIS, NOAA, U.S. Department of Commerce. Greenland Ice Sheet Holocene d18O, Temperature, and Surface Elevation. doi:10.1038/nature08355. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo-search/study/11148. Downloaded 05/05/2018. Personal Research: Between the Holocene Climate Optimum 5980 BCE (+3.550C) and the deepest temperature trough in 1700 CE (-1.310C) the temperature declined 4.860C. Between 1700 and 1940 the temperature then raised 2.870C.].

[66]      R.B. Alley, 2004, “GISP2 Ice Core Temperature and Accumulation Data.” National Centers for Environmental Information, NESDIS, NOAA, U.S. Department of Commerce. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo/study/2475. Downloaded 5/5/2018. [Last Glacial Maximum’s deepest temperature trough was 24,098 years ago (-530C) and the Holocene Climate Optimum was 7,800 years ago (-28.860C). The difference between these time points is 16,297 years and 24.560C.]

[67]      Data: (1) B.M. Vinther et al., 2009, “Holocene thinning of the Greenland ice sheet.” Nature, Vol. 461, pp. 385-388, 17 September 2009. National Centers for Environmental Information, NESDIS, NOAA, U.S. Department of Commerce. Greenland Ice Sheet Holocene d18O, Temperature, and Surface Elevation. doi:10.1038/nature08355. https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/paleo-search/study/11148. Downloaded 05/05/2018. (2) HadCRUT4 near surface temperature data set for the Northern Hemisphere. http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/data/current/download.html. Downloaded 25 July 2018. Personal Research: All 39 climate trough-to-peak temperature rises exceeding +0.990C, between 5980 BCE and 1940 CE were extracted from the temperature data, derived from the Greenland ice core, for group analysis (range, +0.990C to +2.870C, average 77.4 years trough-to-peak, n=39).

[68]      Nicolaj K. Larsen et al., “The response of the southern Greenland ice sheet to the Holocene thermal maximum.” Geology ; 43 (4): 291–294. doi: https://doi.org/10.1130/G36476.1.

[69]      D.S. Kaufman et al., “Holocene thermal maximum in the western Arctic (0–1800W).” Quaternary Science Reviews 23 (2004) 529–560.

[70]      J.P. Briner et al., “Holocene climate change in Arctic Canada and Greenland.” Quaternary Science Reviews (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.quascirev.2016.02.010.

[71]      Global mean surface temperature data, commonly referred to as HadCRUT4. https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/data/current/download.html. [Exposé: Look at the bottom of the first column for the current year-to-date temperature. Subtract the 2018 from the 2016 data point to see the magnitude of the fall. Global Data: https://bit.ly/2nCgctz. Northern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2MRt75G, Southern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2nBfYTA. Tropics Data: https://bit.ly/2nFXJMM. [last downloaded 25/07/2018].

[72]      Polar Portal Season Report 2018. http://bit.ly/2UCuz0q.

[73]      National Centers for Environmental Information (USA). https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global-snow/201810.

[74]      IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 20, section E.1. This section summarizes the IPCC’s most recent climate forecasts.].

[75]      IPCC climate forecasts are highly inaccurate: IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: (1) See page 61, “Box TS.3, Climate Models and the Hiatus in Global Mean Surface Warming of the Past 15 Years.” “111 out of 114 realizations show a GMST trend over 1998–2012 that is higher than the entire HadCRUT4 trend ensemble” Explained by, “This difference between simulated and observed trends could be caused by some combination of (a) internal climate variability, (b) missing or incorrect RF, and (c) model response error.” The correct reason for this forecasting inaccuracy is the IPCC radiative forcing theory and climate forecasts ignore the natural climate system. (2) See page 61 Box TS.3 the penultimate paragraph, “During the 15-year period beginning in 1998, the ensemble of HadCRUT4 GMST trends lies below almost all model-simulated trends (Box TS.3, Figure 1a), whereas during the 15-year period ending in 1998, it lies above 93 out of 114 modeled trends (Box TS.3, Figure 1b; HadCRUT4 ensemble mean trend 0.26°C per decade, CMIP5 ensemble mean trend 0.16°C per decade).” This is followed by, “There is hence very high confidence that the CMIP5 models show long-term GMST trends consistent with observations, despite the disagreement over the most recent 15-year period.(3) See page 62. “The discrepancy between simulated and observed GMST trends during 1998–2012 could be explained in part by a tendency for some CMIP5 models to simulate stronger warming in response to increases in greenhouse-gas concentration than is consistent with observations.” Which is followed by, “As a consequence, it is argued in Chapter 11 that near-term model projections of GMST increase should be scaled down by about 10%. This downward scaling is, however, not sufficient to explain the model mean overestimate of GMST trend over the hiatus period. {10.3.1, 11.3.6}.”].

[76]      The carbon dioxide data (expressed as a mole fraction in dry air, micromol/mol, abbreviated as ppm) used to support this statement was provided by NASA (see link), which cited the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL). https://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases//CMIP5/CO2_OBS_1850-2005.lpl.

[77]         Ole Humlum et al., “The phase relation between atmospheric carbon dioxide and global temperature.” Global and Planetary Change. Volume 100, January 2013, 51-69.

[78]         Manfred Mudelsee, “The phase relations among atmospheric CO2 content, temperature and global ice volume over the past 420 ka.” Quaternary Science Reviews 20 (2001) 583-58.

[79]         Eric Monnin et al., “Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations over the Last Glacial Termination.” By Science 05 Jan 2001: 112-114.

[80]         N. Caillon et al., 2003, “Timing of atmospheric CO2 and Antarctic temperature changes across Termination III.” Science 299: 1728-1731.

[81]         H. Fischer et al., 1999, “Ice core records of atmospheric CO2 around the last three glacial terminations.” Science, 283, 1712-1714.

[82]      IPCC, Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 14. “Figure SPM.5, Radiative forcing estimates in 2011 relative to 1750 and aggregated uncertainties for the main drivers of climate change”. According to the IPCC theory nearly all (98%) radiative forcing factors are attributable to anthropogenic causes while ignoring solar activity (secular changes to solar irradiance, magnetism), geomagnetism, volcanism, solar-modulated atmospheric-ocean circulations, cosmic rays, cloud feedbacks, water vapor, etc.].

[83]         WG1 dismissed solar activity. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4 for solar irradiance and volcanism, “As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance.” “there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.” See page 1007 for how the IPCC dismissed the impact of solar forcing during this grand solar minimum, “As discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4.1.3), the Sun has been in a ‘grand solar maximum’ of magnetic activity on the multi-decadal time scale. However, the most recent solar minimum was the lowest and longest since 1920, and some studies (e.g., Lockwood, 2010) suggest there could be a continued decline towards a much quieter period in the coming decades, but there is low confidence in these projections (Section 8.4.1.3).”].

[84]         WG1 dismissed volcanism. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See pages 1008-1009, “FAQ 11.2 | How Do Volcanic Eruptions Affect Climate and Our Ability to Predict Climate?” While detailing over 1.5 pages about the planetary cooling impact of large magnitude volcanic eruptions we are informed, “The future projections in this report do not include future volcanic eruptions.” See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4 for solar irradiance and volcanism, “As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance and no future volcanic eruptions. Future volcanic eruptions cannot be predicted and there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.”].

[85]         IPCC climate forecasts unrealistically assume no major volcanic eruptions or secular changes in solar irradiance. IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages [Exposé: See page 20. “The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 will likely be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence). This assessment is based on multiple lines of evidence and assumes there will be no major volcanic eruptions or secular changes in total solar irradiance.”].

[86]         A restricted definition of climate change and its mitigation is enforced by Articles 1 and 2. (i.e., climate change blamed on humans, and anthropogenic global warming mitigation): United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations 1992. FCCC/INFORMAL/84, GE.05-62220 (E), 200705. [Exposé: See page 3 and 4 for Article 1 and 2 definitions. Article 1 definition: “Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.Article 2 objective: “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” This definition for climate change was present at the IPCC’s 1988 founding. In other words, the science of climate change was predetermined (human activity, greenhouse gases) and had nothing to do with an international scientific consensus. Article 2’s objective is focused on stabilizing atmospheric greenhouse gases at levels that would prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system, while ensuring food production and sustainable economic development. In other words, in 1988 Article 2 had already determined that human activity was dangerous and that it needed to be mitigated.].

[87]         The radiative forcing theory was installed in 1988 by UNFCCC Articles 1 and 2. Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (1990). Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group 1. J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia 410 pages [Exposé: See the Preface’s Introduction. “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was jointly established by our two organizations in 1988. Under the chairmanship of Professor Bert Bolin, the Panel was charged with: assessing the scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate change issue, such as emissions of major greenhouse gases and modification of the Earth’s radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that needed to enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of climate change to be evaluated, (ii) formulating realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change issue.” The radiative forcing theory was predetermined from the IPCC’s outset. There is no mention of assessing the scientific information relating to natural climate change mechanisms that control earth’s climate over annual, decadal, centennial, millennial, and glacial cycle time-scales.].

[88]      IPCC Procedures enabling WG1-3’s scientific bias. Conduct a Google Search for the following IPCC document. “Procedures for the Preparation, Review, Acceptance, Adoption, Approval and Publication of IPCC Reports” or Appendix A to the Principles Governing IPCC Work Procedures. [Exposé: See Pages 5 and 16; IPCC author-scientists are selected from lists of national experts provided by governments. Pages 7 and 8; government representatives negotiate and agree to the final synthesis report wording line by line. Neither points support that the radiative forcing theory and associated science represent a consensus of the international scientific community.].

[89]      InterAcademy Council confirms the IPCC’s scientific bias and its bias-enabling procedures. Climate Change Assessments. Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. October 2010. Committee Review of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report available at http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/. [Exposé: Page 18; Critiquing the IPCC’s “confirmation bias.” Page 14; Government provided and politically aligned scientists (grant funded). We are told that governments do not always put forward the names of the best climate scientist volunteers for the IPCC work. Political considerations are prioritized over scientific expertise and qualifications in the IPCC scientist selection process. Page 14; “Author selection” enables scientific bias. Co-chairs select lead and coordinating authors from a list of nominees provided by governments. Page 21; lack of independent review of AR1-4 arises because the working group co-chairs also select the review editors. Page 23; final synthesis reports are not written by independent expert scientists, but result from negotiations among government representatives and the IPCC chair and working group co-chairs. Page 24; line-by-line negotiation results in differences between the assessment reports and the final politicized synthesis report provided to governments.].

[90]         Craig D. Idso et al., “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming.” The NIPCC Report on Scientific Consensus (non-International Panel on Climate Change) from the Heartland Institute: http://bit.ly/2LhRh9u. [In this publication, key opinion leaders from marginalized climate science sub-fields and from within the radiative forcing field critique the IPCC’s radiative forcing theory and climate projections].

[91]      Limited oil and gas reserves (WG3, AR5): IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. [Exposé: See page 379. “Section 5.3.4.3 Carbon-intensity, the energy mix, and resource availability: There is little controversy that oil and gas occurrences are abundant, whereas the reserves are more limited, with some 50 years of production for oil and about 70 years for natural gas at the current rates of extraction (Rogner et al., 2012). Reserve additions have shifted to inherently more challenging and potentially costlier locations, with technological progress outbalancing potentially diminishing returns (Nakicenovic et al.,1998; Rogner et al., 2012).”].

[92]      Limited oil and gas reserves (WG3, AR4): IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. [Exposé: See page 265, section 4.3.1. “The proven and probable reserves of oil and gas are enough to last for decades and in the case of coal, centuries (Table. 4.2). Possible undiscovered resources extend these projections even further.”].

[93]      Data. 50 years of proven oil and gas reserves (see Chapter 8): Energy Information Administration data was obtained from: International Energy Statistics. These calculations utilized the following data files. Natural gas https://bit.ly/2LC6GBo, Crude Oil https://bit.ly/2IWeEaP, Coal data https://bit.ly/2L6pk3w. [Comment: Reserve timeline estimates are calculated by dividing the 2013 Energy Information Agency’s proven global oil, natural gas, and coal reserves by 2013 levels of production. This calculation tells us there are 50 years of proven oil and gas, and 130 years of coal reserves left. These reserve timeline estimates do not assume any population or economic growth, or a switch to a cold climate phase, which would accelerate energy demand.].

[94]      U.S. Energy Information Administration report. Technically Recoverable Shale Oil and Shale Gas Resources. An Assessment of 137 Shale Formations in 41 Countries Outside the United States. June 2013. [Critique: See Table 2, page 3 for proven and unproven conventional and non-conventional energy reserves. The US Energy Information Agency reserve revisions mean that one-third of world gas and one-tenth of world oil resources are projections for shale resources. These revisions also mean that 50 percent and 70 percent of total conventional and unconventional oil and gas projections respectively are classified as unproven reserves (i.e., guesstimates). See pages 15-19, Methodology: These 2013 reserve revisions were based on predictions involving the application of historic US shale oil and gas recovery rates to foreign petroliferous basins with similar geophysical characteristics. These revisions assumed the same optimum operating context internationally as in the USA. See Chapter 8 of my book for a more detailed critique on this tenuous assumption.].

[95]      T.R. Klett et al., 2015, U.S. Geological Survey assessment of reserve growth outside of the United States: U.S. Geological Survey Scientific Investigations Report 2015–5091. http://dx.doi.org/10.3133/sir20155091. [Exposé: (1) See page 1; “The U.S. Geological Survey estimated volumes of potential additions to oil and gas reserves for the United States by reserve growth in discovered accumulations. These volumes were derived by using a new methodology developed by the U.S. Geological Survey.” (2) See page 4; Assessment of Reserve Growth Outside of the United States “Because recoverable volumes for individual reservoirs were not reported for many fields outside of the United States, the individual accumulation analysis was not used. Data acquired from individually analyzed U.S. accumulations were used as analogs in this study.Critique: Significant increases in US fossil fuel reserves resulted from the deployment of new, non-validated forecasting methodology. Internationally, the reserve revisions were guesstimates, based on transferring historical precedents for the USA to overseas. None of these methods involved physically verifying the new reserves in the oil and gas wells or fields. That means these are unproven reserves].

[96]      All-time low for discovered resources in 2017: Around 7 billion barrels of oil equivalent was discovered. December 21, 2017. https://www.rystadenergy.com/newsevents/news/press-releases/all-time-low-discovered-resources-2017/.

[97]      Declining Reserve Replacement Ratios Deceiving In Resource Play Environment. November. 28, 2017. View Issue. Maurice Smith. JWN Energy. Daily Oil Bulletin. https://www.sproule.com/application/files/2415/1188/2978/Sproule-Declining-Reserve-Replacement-Ratios-Nora-Stewart-Steve-Golko.pdf.

[98]      Tom Whipple, Online article. “Peak Oil Review.” December 26, 2017. Originally published by ASPO-US. December 26, 2017. https://www.resilience.org/stories/2017-12-26/peak-oil-review-dec-26-2017/

[99]      Kjell Aleklett and Colin J. Campbell, “The peak and decline of world oil and gas production.” Minerals and Energy-Raw Materials Report 18.1 (2003): 5-20.

[100]     Ian Chapman, 2014, “The end of Peak Oil? Why this topic is still relevant despite recent denials.” Energy Policy, 64 . 93-101. http://insight.cumbria.ac.uk/id/eprint/1708/.

[101]     The Brundtland Report “Our Common Future.” Published in 1987 by the United Nations through the Oxford University Press. To view the report, click the link (http://www.sustainabledevelopment2015.org/AdvocacyToolkit/index.php/earth-summit-history/historical-documents/92-our-common-future). [Exposé: View Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development, sub-Section 4: “Ensuring a sustainable level of population.”].

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