Quoted proof the IPCC dismissed catastrophic natural climate change risks

INCRIMINATING DISCLOSURES BY THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (“QUOTES”)

UNFCCC Articles 1 and 2 have dictated the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) restricted-contrived key-risk assessment provided to governments. This contrivance impacts the structure of the IPCC arguments and its argument buttressing confirmation bias. This has resulted in the dismissal/omission of natural climate change risks linked to global cooling, glaciation, climate-forcing volcanism, solar activity and its extreme cooling-drought-precipitation, and pandemic influenza. A full exposition of what the IPCC has done can be viewed via this hyperlink, along with omitted peer reviewed science and data (endnote citations) that refutes or falsifies the IPCC’s politicized opinion. This email was sent to 890 IPCC staff and working group scientists and 670 world media contacts on 16/04/2019, and subsequently to the Club of Rome, world media, and many politicians.

The following information (“quoted IPCC copyrighted text”) was extracted from the IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (1st and 4th) and is generally unknown by academia, by governments, the corporate and financial communities, the world’s media, and by the public—due to its burial in thousands of pages of IPCC text (“needles in a haystack”). All quotations below are copyright protected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This information is publicly exposed under Fair Use Rules in the interests of global human safety. This text must not be copied, downloaded, forwarded, or modified. It is placed on this website for information purposes only. If you use this information by any means then this use will be at your own risk and/or subject to the terms specified by the copyright owner (https://www.ipcc.ch/copyright/). Navigable links and page numbers are provided below to the IPCC documents so you can verify the quotes for yourself. The author of this blog text rescinds all copyright ownership in this blog text. Date: 3rd July 2019.

THE IPCC ONLY ASSESSED RISKS RELEVANT TO ARTICLE 2

• Working Group 2 (WG2) tell us the climate risks are only those relevant to UNFCCC Article 2 (anthropogenic global warming, AGW): (1) Page 59, Section B-1. Key Risks across Sectors and Regions. “Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which refers to “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” (2) Pages 59-65 for the IPCC’s projected key risks linked only to global warming.[1] (NB: there is no inclusion of natural climate change risks linked to global cooling, climate-forcing volcanism, rapid climate change, and pandemic influenza in the IPCC’s stated key-risks, and which are most relevant to the 21st century—millennia after the Holocene Climate Optimum, at the end of this most extreme Arctic warming phase due to switch to its cooling/glaciation mode, and upon progressing into this grand solar minimum.)
• WG2 tell us “Key risks” are potentially severe impacts relevant to Article 2 (i.e., AGW-related risks only). Page 11. B: FUTURE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADAPTATION. B-1. Key Risks across Sectors and Regions. “Key risks are potentially severe impacts relevant to Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which refers to “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”[2]
• WG2 claim climate risks can be reduced by cutting emissions: Page 13 specifies risks linked to global warming i.e., sea level rise and flooding, extreme weather events, food and water insecurity, and loss of biodiversity. Page 14. “The overall risks of climate change impacts can be reduced by limiting the rate and magnitude of climate change. Risks are reduced substantially under the assessed scenario with the lowest temperature projections (RCP2.6 – low emissions) compared to the highest temperature projections (RCP8.5 – high emissions), particularly in the second half of the 21st century (very high confidence).”[3]
• The IPCC’s stated key risks. See pages 13-19, from section “SPM 2.3 Future risks and impacts caused by a changing climate,” including page 14’s Figure SPM.8 Representative key risks for each region, to better understand the 100% global warming bias, and that no rapid climate change risks are included (cold or hot).[4]

THE IPCC DISMISSED/OMITTED CATASTROPHIC NATURAL CLIMATE CHANGE RISKS

• WG1 dismissed the prospect of near- and long-term abrupt climate change: (1) Page 70, TFE.5. Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. “There is information on potential consequences of some abrupt changes, but in general there is low confidence and little consensus on the likelihood of such events over the 21st century. Examples of components susceptible to such abrupt change are the strength of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC), clathrate methane release, tropical and boreal forest dieback, disappearance of summer sea ice in the Arctic Ocean, long-term drought and monsoonal circulation.” (2) Page 84 5.4.7 Possibility of Near-term Abrupt Changes in Climate: “There are various mechanisms that could lead to changes in global or regional climate that are abrupt by comparison with rates experienced in recent decades. The likelihood of such changes is generally lower for the near term than for the long term. For this reason the relevant mechanisms are primarily assessed in the TS.5 sections on long-term changes and in TFE.5. {11.3.4}” (3) Page 1114, Section 12.5.5 Potentially Abrupt or Irreversible Changes: “This report adopts the definition of abrupt climate change used in Synthesis and Assessment Product 3.4 of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program CCSP (CCSP, 2008b).” (4) Page 1115, “Table 12.4: Components in the Earth system that have been proposed in the literature as potentially being susceptible to abrupt or irreversible change. Column 2 defines whether or not a potential change can be considered to be abrupt under the AR5 definition.” (NB: Under this restrictive definition WG1 only details abrupt climate change risks relevant to global warming. WG1 limited the definition of abrupt climate change, rather than comprehensively analyze historical data (without bias) associated with the rapid climate change catastrophes that took place just before and after the Holocene Climate Optimum—which are the most relevant to the 21st century i.e., the Younger Dryas, the 8.2Kyr, 5.9Kyr, 4.2Kyr rapid climate change events (and others), the Little Ice Age, and climate-forcing volcanism.[5]
• WG2 dismissed lessons from historical climate catastrophes as irrelevant today (i.e., the Little Ice Age, post-Holocene Climate Optimum rapid climate change events, and by inference their associated climate-forcing volcanism). (1) Page 771-772. “There is a specific research field that explores the relationship between large-scale disruptions in climate and the collapse of past empires.” “DeMenocal (2001) summarizes evidence that suggests that major changes in weather patterns coincided with the collapse of several previously powerful civilizations, including the Anasazi, the Akkadian (i.e., associated with the 2Kyr rapid climate change event), Classic Maya, Mochica, and Tiwanaku empires. Other historical reference points of the interaction of climate with society emerge from analysis of the Little Ice Age. Some studies show that the Little Ice Age in the mid-17th century was associated with more cases of political upheaval and warfare than in any other period (Parker, 2008; Zhang et al., 2011), including in Europe (Tol and Wagner, 2010), China (Brook, 2010), and the Ottoman empire (White, S., 2011).” This is then followed by WG1’s dismissal of the relevance of these historical catastrophes in today’s world; “The precise causal pathways that link these changes in climate to changes in civilizations are not well understood due to data limitations (NB: the same can be said for forecasting the GMST). Therefore, it should be noted that these findings from historical antecedents are not directly transferable to the contemporary globalized world.” (NB: Confirmation bias) (2) See page 1001, section 18.4.5. “Some studies have suggested that levels of warfare in Europe and Asia were relatively high during the Little Ice Age (Parker, 2008; Brook, 2010; Tol and Wagner, 2010; White, 2011; Zhang et al., 2011), but for the same reasons the detection of the effect of climate change and an assessment of its importance can be made only with low confidence.”[6] (NB: Confirmation bias)
• Abrupt methane release last happened 55 million years ago when no ice existed in either pole (an irrelevant example that was dismissed). (1) Page 70-71, TFE.5, Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. In a theoretical discussion focused only on methane release (from wetlands, permafrost, and ocean hydrates), we are told; “It is very unlikely that CH4 from clathrates will undergo catastrophic release during the 21st century (high confidence).” (CH4 = methane).[7] (2) Page 1079. “WGI AR5 finds low confidence in modelling abilities to simulate transient changes in hydrate inventories, but large CH4 release to the atmosphere during this century is unlikely” (WGI AR5 Section 6.4.7.3).”[8]
• Dansgaard-Oeschger rapid warming episodes and Heinrich events were reviewed then dismissed (an irrelevant example that was dismissed i.e., these events occur during the depths of an ice age once the ice caps have formed). (1) Page 421. “The most prominent abrupt climate change periods in the recent geological record, developing within 10 to 100 years, are associated with Dansgaard-Oeschger (DO) and Heinrich events (WGI AR5 Section 5.7), which occurred repetitively during the last 120 kyr.”[9] (2) Page 432, “Section 5.7: Evidence and Processes of Abrupt Climate Change. This assessment of abrupt climate change on time scales of 10 to 100 years focuses on Dansgaard-Oeschger (DO) events and iceberg/melt-water discharges during Heinrich events.”].[10]
• The IPCC’s review of the Younger Dryas focused only on its recovery-warming phase rather than the rapid decline in Arctic/Northern Hemisphere temperatures that caused major extinctions (-9°C in decades). Page 280. “Rapid, regional warming before and after the Younger Dryas cooling event (11.7 to 12.9 ka) provides a relatively recent analogy for climate change at a rate approaching, for many regions, that projected for the 21st century for all Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs; Alley et al., 2003; Steffensen et al., 2008). Ecosystems and species responded rapidly during the Younger Dryas by shifting distributions and abundances, and there were some notable large animal extinctions, probably exacerbated by human activities (Gill et al., 2009; Dawson et al., 2011). (NB: these extinctions happened during the cold/glaciation phase, and not the warming-recovery phase) In some regions, species became locally or regionally extinct (extirpated), but there is no evidence for climate-driven global-scale extinctions during this period (Botkin et al., 2007; Willis, K.J. et al., 2010). However, the Younger Dryas climate changes differ from those projected for the future because they were regional rather than global; may have only regionally exceeded rates of warming projected for the future; and started from a baseline substantially colder than present (Alley et al., 2003).”[11] (NB: a Younger Dryas-like rapid climate change event would pose major risks to the Northern Hemisphere at the very least)
• The Rapid or Abrupt Climate Change Events in the last 8,200 years: Page 433, “The abrupt climate-change event at 8.2 ka permits the study of the recovery time of the AMOC to freshwater perturbation under near-modern boundary conditions (Rohling and Pälike, 2005).”[12] (NB: Rather than analyze the cluster of climate forcing volcanic eruptions that occurred during this event, and the steep decline in Arctic ice core temperatures i.e., -3.5°C in decades.)
• IPCC dismissed a rapid weakening of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC). Page 1119, “Abrupt Saharan vegetation changes of the Younger Dryas are linked with a rapid AMOC weakening which is considered very unlikely during the 21st century and unlikely beyond that as a consequence of global warming.”[13] (NB: the IPCC recognizes the abrupt impact of this event on the Sahara. It ignores/dismisses the more likely causes of AMOC weakening i.e., atmospheric blocking, climate forcing volcanism, and a grand solar minimum.)
• Atmospheric blocking and AMOC. Page 1247, Box 14.2 Blocking (NB: Atmospheric blocking). “At interannual time scales, there are statistically significant relationships between blocking activity and several dominant modes of atmospheric variability, such as the NAO (Section 14.5.1) and wintertime blocking in the Euro-Atlantic sector (Croci-Maspoli et al., 2007a; Luo et al., 2010), the winter PNA (Section 14.7.1) and blocking frequency in the North Pacific (Croci-Maspoli et al., 2007a), or the SAM (Section 14.5.2) and winter blocking activity near the New Zealand sector (Berrisford et al., 2007). (NB: North Atlantic Oscillation, or NAO, is associated with solar activity and switches to its negative phase during grand solar minimum i.e., cooling phase) Multi-decadal variability in winter blocking over the North Atlantic and the North Pacific seem to be related, respectively, with the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC; Häkkinen et al., 2011; Section 14.7.6) and the Pacific Decadal Oscillation (PDO; Chen and Yoon, 2002; Section14.7.3), although this remains an open question. Other important scientific issues related to the blocking phenomenon include the mechanisms of blocking onset and maintenance, two way interactions between blocking and stratospheric processes (e.g., Martius et al., 2009; Woollings et al., 2010), influence on blocking of slowly varying components of the climate system (sea surface temperature (SST), sea ice, etc., Liu et al., 2012b), and external forcings. The most consistent long-term observed trends in blocking for the second half of the 20th century are the reduced winter activity over the North Atlantic (e.g., Croci-Maspoli et al., 2007b), which is consistent with the observed increasing North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) trend from the 1960s to the mid-1990s (Section 2.7.8), as well as an eastward shift of intense winter blocking over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans (Davini et al., 2012). The apparent decreasing trend in SH blocking activity (e.g., Dong et al., 2008) seems to be in agreement with the upward trend in the SAM.”[14]
• Global warming induced Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) collapse: (1) Page 24, Section E4 Ocean. “It is very unlikely that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century for the scenarios considered.” (NB: With reference to the IPCC’s four promoted Representative Concentration Pathway global warming scenarios.) (2) Page 70, “TFE.5. Irreversibility and Abrupt Change. “Abrupt Climate Change Linked with AMOC New transient climate model simulations have confirmed with high confidence that strong changes in the strength of the AMOC produce abrupt climate changes at global scale with magnitude and pattern resembling past glacial Dansgaard–Oeschger events and Heinrich stadials.” “It also remains very unlikely that the AMOC will undergo an abrupt transition or collapse in the 21st century for the scenarios considered (high confidence) (TFE.5, Figure 1).” (3) Page 1115,“The FIO-ESM model shows cooling over much of the NH that may be related to a strong reduction of the AMOC in all RCP scenarios (even RCP2.6), but the limited output available from the model precludes an assessment of the response and realism of this response. Hence it is not included the overall assessment of the likelihood of abrupt changes.” (NB: Confirmation bias for this latter point i.e. they dismissed this models conclusion).[15]

THE IPCC CLIMATE FORECAST INACCURACY AND ITS UNSCIENTIFIC (POOR, BIASED) EXPLANATION

• The IPCC’s highly inaccurate climate forecasts (84-97%) and weak explanations ignore natural climate change and its cooling impact. (1) Theory refuting forecast inaccuracy. Pages 61-63, Box TS.3, Climate Models and the Hiatus in Global Mean Surface Warming of the Past 15 Years. “However, an analysis of the full suite of CMIP5 historical simulations (augmented for the period 2006–2012 by RCP4.5 simulations) reveals that 111 out of 114 realizations show a GMST trend over 1998–2012 that is higher than the entire HadCRUT4 trend ensemble (Box TS.3, Figure 1a; CMIP5 ensemble mean trend is 0.21°C per decade).” “During the 15-year period beginning in 1998, the ensemble of HadCRUT4 GMST trends lies below almost all model-simulated trends (Box TS.3, Figure 1a), whereas during the 15-year period ending in 1998, it lies above 93 out of 114 modelled trends (Box TS.3, Figure 1b; HadCRUT4 ensemble mean trend 0.26°C per decade, CMIP5 ensemble mean trend 0.16°C per decade)”. (2) Scientifically weak explanation: Pages 61-63, Box TS.3, Climate Models and the Hiatus in Global Mean Surface Warming of the Past 15 Years. “This difference between simulated and observed trends could be caused by some combination of (a) internal climate variability, (b) missing or incorrect RF, and (c) model response error. These potential sources of the difference, which are not mutually exclusive, are assessed below, as is the cause of the observed GMST trend hiatus. {2.4.3, 9.3.2, 9.4.1; Box 9.2}.” “The discrepancy between simulated and observed GMST trends during 1998–2012 could be explained in part by a tendency for some CMIP5 models to simulate stronger warming in response to increases in greenhouse-gas concentration than is consistent with observations.” “As a consequence, it is argued in Chapter 11 that near-term model projections of GMST increase should be scaled down by about 10%. This downward scaling is, however, not sufficient to explain the model mean overestimate of GMST trend over the hiatus period. {10.3.1, 11.3.6}.” NB: Despite this abject failure to accurately forecast the global mean surface temperature, “There is hence very high confidence that the CMIP5 models show long-term GMST trends consistent with observations, despite the disagreement over the most recent 15-year period.” (i.e., during the climate hiatus.). (3) This high inaccuracy of global temperature forecasts can simply be explained by the fact that the IPCC dismissed or omitted the role of the natural climate system from its poor explanation, its radiative forcing theory, and forecasting models. For example, Page 14, “Figure SPM.5, Radiative forcing estimates in 2011 relative to 1750 and aggregated uncertainties for the main drivers of climate change”. According to these radiative forcing estimates, nearly all (i.e., 98%) of radiative forcing factors driving climate change are attributable to anthropogenic causes. Page 62 “Although the forcing uncertainties are substantial, there are no apparent incorrect or missing global mean forcings in the CMIP5 models over the last 15 years that could explain the model–observations difference during the warming hiatus. {9.4.6}.”[16] (NB: There are missing climate forcings from its theory and forecasts, commonly referred to as natural climate change, which the IPCC dismissed or omitted. The natural climate system (NCC) controls seasonal-, annual-, decadal- and centennial-scale, and glacial cycle temperature oscillations, just as it has done since time immemorial. The NCC system includes solar activity (short- and long-term changes to solar irradiance and magnetism), orbital modulation of solar outputs reaching earth, geomagnetism, volcanic aerosols, solar-orbital-rotational modulation of atmospheric and ocean circulations, cosmic rays and low clouds, other cloud feedbacks (at different latitudes and altitudes), and water vapor (natural and anthropogenic sources), etc.)
• 2014 Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) Climate Predictions are already inaccurate (2018). Underpinning the IPCC’s key-risk assessment is the following cited global warming projections, linked to its theory that is unable to accurately forecast the global mean surface temperature (1986-2016). Page 20, Section E.1 Atmosphere Temperature. “The global mean surface temperature change for the period 2016–2035 relative to 1986–2005 will likely be in the range of 0.3°C to 0.7°C (medium confidence). This assessment is based on multiple lines of evidence and assumes there will be no major volcanic eruptions or secular changes in total solar irradiance.” “It is virtually certain that there will be more frequent hot and fewer cold temperature extremes over most land areas on daily and seasonal timescales as global mean temperatures increase. It is very likely that heat waves will occur with a higher frequency and duration. Occasional cold winter extremes will continue to occur.”[17] (NB: The global and northern hemisphere temperatures declined by 0.2^°C and 0.27°C respectively between 2016 and 2018, rendering AR5’s forecasts inaccurate already. In addition, these ensembles of forecasts fail to follow the natural climate change oscillations.[18]
• The IPCC erroneously dismissed the prospect and impact of this grand solar minimum in its forecasts and key-risk assessment – despite non-IPCC experts predicting a return to a Little Ice Age-like climate in the decades ahead. (1) Page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4 for solar irradiance and volcanism, “As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance.” (NB: while omitting the climate-forcing impact of solar magnetism) “there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.” (NB: Confirmation bias.). (2) See page 1007 for how the IPCC dismissed the impact of solar forcing during this grand solar minimum, “As discussed in Chapter 8 (Section 8.4.1.3), the Sun has been in a ‘grand solar maximum’ of magnetic activity on the multi-decadal time scale. However, the most recent solar minimum was the lowest and longest since 1920, and some studies (e.g., Lockwood, 2010) suggest there could be a continued decline towards a much quieter period in the coming decades, but there is low confidence in these projections (Section 8.4.1.3). (NB: Confirmation bias) Nevertheless, if there is such a reduction in solar activity, there is high confidence that the variations in TSI RF will be much smaller than the projected increased forcing due to GHGs (Section 8.4.1.3).”[19] (NB: This conclusion ignores the climate-forcing impact of solar magnetism and grand solar minimum-related climate forcing volcanism, while assuming their theory is correct even with 84-97% forecasting inaccuracy. The IPCC’s review of “grand solar minimum” involved only one end of chapter citation in all AR5 documents. This dismissal was despite the extensive literature and alternative climate forecasts linked to solar activity.)
• WG1 erroneously dismissed the planetary cooling impact of volcanic eruptions from its climate forecasts. Pages 1008-1009, “FAQ 11.2, How Do Volcanic Eruptions Affect Climate and Our Ability to Predict Climate?” While detailing over 1.5 pages about the planetary cooling impact of large magnitude volcanic eruptions we are informed, “The future projections in this report do not include future volcanic eruptions.” See page 1009 sub-section 11.3.6.3 point 4 for solar irradiance and volcanism, “As discussed in Section 11.3.6.2, the RCP scenarios assume no underlying trend in total solar irradiance and no future volcanic eruptions. Future volcanic eruptions cannot be predicted and there is low confidence in projected changes in solar irradiance (Chapter 8). Consequently the possible effects of future changes in natural forcings are excluded from the assessment here.”[20] (NB: Confirmation bias. Volcanic eruptions can be forecasted based on probabilities derived from analyzing the historical data.)
• The IPCC knows solar and volcanic activity contributed substantially to the Little Ice Age’s climate change, yet dismissed their climate-forcing impact from its forecasts and key-risk assessments (i.e., their cooling impact undermines the IPCC global warming predictions). (1) Pages 37, “Based on the comparison between reconstructions and simulations, there is high confidence that not only external orbital, solar and volcanic forcing, but also internal variability, contributed substantially to the spatial pattern and timing of surface temperature changes between the Medieval Climate Anomaly and the Little Ice Age (1450–1850). {5.3.5, 5.5.1}.” “There is high confidence for droughts during the last millennium of greater magnitude and longer duration than those observed since the beginning of the 20th century in many regions. There is medium confidence that more megadroughts occurred in monsoon Asia and wetter conditions prevailed in arid Central Asia and the South American monsoon region during the Little Ice Age (1450–1850) compared to the Medieval Climate Anomaly (950–1250). {5.5.4, 5.5.5}.” (NB: associated with its 4 grand solar minima periods) (2) Page 77 “Based on the comparison between reconstructions and simulations, there is high confidence that not only external orbital, solar and volcanic forcing but also internal variability contributed substantially to the spatial pattern and timing of surface temperature changes between the Medieval Climate Anomaly and the Little Ice Age (about 1450 to 1850). However, there is only very low confidence in quantitative estimates of their relative contributions. It is very unlikely that NH temperature variations from 1400 to 1850 can be explained by internal variability alone. There is medium confidence that external forcing contributed to Northern Hemispheric temperature variability from 850 to 1400 and that external forcing contributed to European temperature variations over the last centuries. {5.3.5, 5.5.1, 10.7.2, 10.7.5; Table 10.1}.” (3) Page 112 Floods and Droughts: “On millennial time scales, there is high confidence that proxy information provides evidence of droughts of greater magnitude and longer duration than observed during the 20th century in many regions. There is medium confidence that more megadroughts occurred in monsoon Asia and wetter conditions prevailed in arid Central Asia and the South American monsoon region during the Little Ice Age (1450 to 1850) compared to the Medieval Climate Anomaly (950 to 1250). {2.6.2, 5.5.4, 5.5.5, 10.6.1}.” (4) Page 408 “The median of the NH temperature reconstructions (Figure 5.7) indicates mostly warm conditions from about 950 to about 1250 and colder conditions from about 1450 to about 1850; these time intervals are chosen here to represent the MCA and the LIA, respectively.” (5) Page 885, “The combined influence of volcanism, solar forcing and a small drop in greenhouse gases (GHGs) likely contributed to Northern Hemisphere cooling during the LIA (Section 10.7.2). Solar radiative forcing (RF) from the Maunder Minimum (1745) to the satellite era (average of 1976–2006) has been estimated to be +0.08 to +0.18 W m–2 (low confidence, Section 8.4.1.2). This may have contributed to early 20th century warming (low confidence, Section 10.3.1).” (6) Page 918, “Detection and attribution studies support results from modelling studies that infer a strong role of external forcing in the cooling of NH temperatures during the Little Ice Age (LIA; see Chapter 5 and Glossary).” (7) Page 1151, “The combined records indicate that a net decline of global glacier volume began in the 19th century, before significant anthropogenic RF had started, and was probably the result of warming associated with the termination of the Little Ice Age (Crowley, 2000; Gregory et al., 2006, 2013b).”[21]
• Key limitations of CMIP5 models (i.e., volcanism) were known to the IPCC yet these were not cited as reasons for its high forecasting inaccuracy. Extract from a publication, “All available models submitted to the CMIP5 archive as of April 2012 that had a reasonably realistic representation of volcanic eruptions and number of samples have been analyzed for their ability to simulate post-volcanic radiative and dynamic responses. With substantially different dynamics between the models it was hoped to find at least one model simulation that was dynamically consistent with observations, showing improvement since S06. Disappointingly, we found that again, as with S06, despite relatively consistent post volcanic radiative changes, none of the models manage to simulate a sufficiently strong dynamical response.”[22] (NB: This CMIP5 model limitation reference was cited by AR5s Working Group 1 on page 833,[23] meaning the limitations of CMIP5 models were known to the IPCC but was not mentioned when explaining their high forecast inaccuracy.)

THE IPCC CHANGED THE IMMUTABLE ICE AGE BOUNDARIES WITHOUT PEER REVIEW SCRUTINY (ELIMINATES GLOBAL WARMING CONTESTATION)

• WG1 (AR4) deferred the ice age 30,000 years without subjecting that erroneous assumption to peer review. (1) Page 56, Box TS.6. “The Milankovitch, or ‘orbital’ theory of the ice ages is now well developed (NB: incorrect). Ice ages are generally triggered by minima in high-latitude NH summer insolation, enabling winter snowfall to persist through the year and therefore accumulate to build NH glacial ice sheets.” Followed by, “Available evidence indicates that the current warming will not be mitigated by a natural cooling trend towards glacial conditions. Understanding of the Earth’s response to orbital forcing indicates that the Earth would not naturally enter another ice age for at least 30,000 years. {6.4, FAQ 6.1}.” (2) Page 85 section TS.6.2.4 Paleoclimate under “Robust Findings” “It is very unlikely that the Earth would naturally enter another ice age for at least 30,000 years. {6.4}”).[24] (NB: incorrect)
• WG1 (AR5) dismissed the ice age by 50,000 years without subjecting that erroneous assumption to peer review. Page 70, “It is virtually certain that orbital forcing will be unable to trigger widespread glaciation during the next 1000 years. Paleoclimate records indicate that, for orbital configurations close to the present one, glacial inceptions only occurred for atmospheric CO2 concentrations significantly lower than pre-industrial levels. Climate models simulate no glacial inception during the next 50,000 years if CO2 concentrations remain above 300 ppm. {5.8.3, Box 6.2}.”[25] (NB: incorrect)
• The last ice age ended about 10,000 years ago (incorrect assumption). Page 124, Table 1.1. “Since the end of the last ice age, about 10,000 years ago, global surface temperatures have probably fluctuated by little more than 1°C.”[26] (NB: incorrect)

THE IPCC CONFIRMS OUR LIMITED ‘PROVEN’ OIL & GAS RESERVES (ZERO EMMISSIONS 2050 = CRITICAL RESERVES DEPLETION)

• The IPCC discloses our limited oil and gas reserves AR5 (but without emphasis). Page 379. “There is little controversy that oil and gas occurrences are abundant, whereas the reserves are more limited, with some 50 years of production for oil and about 70 years for natural gas at the current rates of extraction (Rogner et al., 2012). Reserve additions have shifted to inherently more challenging and potentially costlier locations, with technological progress outbalancing potentially diminishing returns (Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Rogner et al., 2012).”[27]
• The IPCC discloses our limited oil and gas reserves AR4 (without emphasis). Page 265, section 4.3.1. “The proven and probable reserves of oil and gas are enough to last for decades and in the case of coal, centuries (Table. 4.2). Possible undiscovered resources extend these projections even further.”[28]

UNFCCC ARTICLES 1 & 2 DICTATE A SCIENTIFIC PARADIGM, KEY-RISK ASSESSMENTS AND MITIGATION PLANS, & ENABLE SCIENTIFIC BIAS

• A restricted definition of climate change linked to dangerous human activity and the need for its mitigation was pre-determined in 1988, and enforced by UNFCCC Articles 1 and 2. Article 1 definition: “Climate change means a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate variability observed over comparable time periods.” Article 2 objective: “The ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (NB: This definition and mitigation objective for climate change was present at the IPCC’s 1988 founding. In other words, dangerous anthropogenic global warming linked to greenhouse gas emissions was predetermined in 1998, and had nothing to do with an international scientific consensus).[29]
• The radiative forcing theory was installed in 1988 by UNFCCC Articles 1 and 2. [See the Preface’s “The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was jointly established by our two organizations in 1988. Under the chairmanship of Professor Bert Bolin, the Panel was charged with: assessing the scientific information that is related to the various components of the climate change issue, such as emissions of major greenhouse gases and modification of the Earth’s radiation balance resulting therefrom, and that needed to enable the environmental and socio-economic consequences of climate change to be evaluated, (ii) formulating realistic response strategies for the management of the climate change issue.”[30] (NB: this confirms the bias of the IPCC’s scientific assessment in its first scientific assessment in 1990).
• IPCC scientific assessments do not represent a scientific consensus but rather cater to politicians in a biased manner. (1) 1990, “The result is the most authoritative and strongly supported statement on climate change made by the international scientific community. The issues confronted with full rigor include: global warming, greenhouse gases, the greenhouse effect, sea level changes, forcing of climate, and the history of Earth’s changing climate”[31]. (NB: Confirmation bias) (2) 2007, Preface Page vii. “The Working Group I report focuses on those aspects of the current understanding of the physical science of climate change that are judged to be most relevant to policymakers. It does not attempt to review the evolution of scientific understanding or to cover all of climate science.”[32] (NB: Confirmation bias) (3) 2015, ”Underlying all aspects of the report is a strong commitment to assessing the science comprehensively, without bias and in a way that is relevant to policy but not policy prescriptive.” (NB: an oxymoron). Page 661 Chapter 8, Executive Summary. “As in previous IPCC assessments, the fifth assessment report uses the radiative forcing (RF) concept, but it also introduces effective radiative forcing (ERF).” [33] Preface, page vii “Focused on those aspects of the current understanding of the science of climate change that were judged to be most relevant to policymakers.” [34] (NB: Confirmation bias).
• InterAcademy Council conducted an audit on the IPCC processes and procedures in 2010 and confirmed the IPCC’s scientific bias. Page 18; Critiquing the IPCC’s “confirmation bias.” (1) Page 14; Government provided and politically aligned scientists. We are told that governments do not always put forward the names of the best climate scientist volunteers for the IPCC work. Political considerations are prioritized over scientific expertise and qualifications in the IPCC scientist selection process. (2) Page 14; “Author selection” enables scientific bias. Co-chairs select lead and coordinating authors from a list of nominees provided by governments. Page 21; lack of independent review of AR1-4 arises because the working group co-chairs also select the review editors. (3) Page 23; final synthesis reports are not written by independent expert scientists, but result from negotiations among government representatives and the IPCC chair and working group co-chairs. (4) Page 24; line-by-line negotiation results in differences between the assessment reports and the final politicized synthesis report provided to governments.[35]

ENDNOTES

[1]     IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[2]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[3]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[4]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 151 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XjtSJh)

[5]    IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[6]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[7]    IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[8]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[9]    IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[10] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[11] IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Field, C.B., V.R. Barros, D.J. Dokken, K.J. Mach, M.D. Mastrandrea, T.E. Bilir, M. Chatterjee, K.L. Ebi, Y.O. Estrada, R.C. Genova, B. Girma, E.S. Kissel, A.N. Levy, S. MacCracken, P.R. Mastrandrea, and L.L. White (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1132 pp. (http://bit.ly/2xx8dml)

[12] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[13] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[14] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[15] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[16] Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[17] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[18]    Global mean surface temperature data, commonly referred to as HadCRUT4. https://www.metoffice.gov.uk/hadobs/hadcrut4/data/current/download.html. Look at the bottom of the first column for the current year-to-date temperature. Subtract the 2018 from the 2016 data point to see the magnitude of the fall. Global Data: https://bit.ly/2nCgctz. Northern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2MRt75G, Southern Hemisphere Data: https://bit.ly/2nBfYTA Tropics Data: https://bit.ly/2nFXJMM.

[19] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[20] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[21] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[22] S. Driscoll et al., ( 2012). Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 5 (CMIP5) simulations of climate following volcanic eruptions, J. Geophysical Research, 117, D17105, doi:10.1029/2012JD017607. (http://bit.ly/2JjC9Ib)

[23] Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[24] Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 996 pages. (http://bit.ly/2xne2mz)

[25] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[26] Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[27] IPCC, Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Edenhofer, O., R. Pichs-Madruga, Y. Sokona, E. Farahani, S. Kadner, K. Seyboth, A. Adler, I. Baum, S. Brunner, P. Eickemeier, B. Kriemann, J. Savolainen, S. Schlömer, C. von Stechow, T. Zwickel and J.C. Minx (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. (http://bit.ly/2RNWVnk)

[28] IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [B. Metz, O.R. Davidson, P.R. Bosch, R. Dave, L.A. Meyer (eds)], Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. (http://bit.ly/2LxBoOE)

[29] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations 1992. FCCC/INFORMAL/84, GE.05-62220 (E), 200705. (http://bit.ly/325BfYy)

[30] IPCC 1990. Climate Change. The IPCC Scientific Assessment (First). Edited by J.T. Houghton, G.J.Jenkins and J.J.Ephraums. Cambridge University Press. (http://bit.ly/2Xo9w6t)

[31] Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment (1990). Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group 1. J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins and J.J. Ephraums (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Great Britain, New York, NY, USA and Melbourne, Australia 410 pages. (NB: the editors worked for the Meteorological Office, Bracknell, UK. The HadCRUT temperature indices represent a collaborative product of the Met Office Hadley Centre and the Climatic Research Unit at the University of East Anglia (i.e., Hacked email scandal). The HadCRUT temperature indices have been extensively used by the IPCC over the years to fear monger the public about global warming. These temperature indices were modified numerous times over the years. These modifications resulted in a smoothing out of the global cooling periods prior to 1970, while accentuating the post-1970 global warming.) (http://bit.ly/2Xo9w6t)

[32] IPCC, 2007: Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M. Tignor and H.L. Miller (eds.). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 996 pp. (http://bit.ly/2xne2mz)

[33] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[34] IPCC, 2013: Climate Change 2013: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Stocker, T.F., D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S.K. Allen, J. Boschung, A. Nauels, Y. Xia, V. Bex and P.M. Midgley (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA, 1535 pages. (http://bit.ly/2XopoGp)

[35] Climate Change Assessments. Review of the processes and procedures of the IPCC. October 2010. Committee Review of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Report available at http://reviewipcc.interacademycouncil.net/.